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In the late currency board years, Argentina faced a real exchange rate adjustment through price 
deflation amidst growing devaluation expectations. Using a firm-level panel database to analyze 
the incidence of these factors on the currency composition of private debt and on firms’ 
performance, we find that widespread debt dollarization showed no relationship with the firms’ 
production mix or the ever-changing probability of a nominal devaluation. While relative price 
changes favored export-oriented firms with the expected impact on sales, earnings and 
investment, increases in devaluation expectations elicited only a marginal differential response in 
investment from more financially dollarized firms. Our findings provide support to two 
criticisms faced by the Argentine currency board in recent years, namely, that by fueling beliefs 
in an implicit guarantee it stimulated across-the-board debt dollarization, and that it could not 
fully isolate the economy from real shocks, as the feared balance sheet effect was replaced by a 
gradual but equally deleterious debt deflation effect. 
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Firm-level effects of exchange rate volatility have been increasingly at the center of the exchange 
rate regime debate for developing economies. In a nutshell, the so-called “balance sheet” 
approach emphasizes that, by funding domestic credit in a foreign currency (either through 
dollarized domestic savings or through foreign borrowing), systemic exposure to exchange rate 
risk increases either at the bank level (if financial regulations allow institutions to run unbalanced 
foreign currency positions) or, more typically, at the firm level (more precisely, through the 
exchange rate risk exposure of dollar indebted non-dollar earners). This approach has been used 
to argue against attempts to deepen financial intermediation in emerging economies through 
increased reliance on a foreign currency, and to criticize exchange rate-based stabilizations that 
induce financial dollarization through the perception of a public exchange rate guarantee. On the 
other hand, it has also been used to explain the propensity of developing economies to reduce 
exchange rate volatility under any de jure exchange rate regime, and to argue in favor of the 
adoption of superfixed exchange rate arrangements (including unilateral dollarization).
1  
 
Exchange rate-related balance sheet effects, however, are a more general phenomenon 
ultimately derived from the lack of a strong national currency. Emerging economies tend to have 
weak currencies, namely, currencies that are not accepted as store of value either domestically or 
internationally. In the domestic case, the immediate symptom is that the public prefers to save 
mainly in a foreign currency (inducing financial dollarization) or, if this is restricted by the 
monetary authorities, in short-term local currency assets or directly offshore. As a result, when 
financial dollarization is allowed, debtors from the non-tradable sector end up with debts 
denominated in tradables, increasing their exchange rate exposure. On the contrary, when not 
dollarized, “a country with a weak currency displays pronounced short-termism in financial 
contracts, with investors lured towards the peso by instruments that re-price very frequently (e.g., 
deposits with interest rates that adjust daily in line with the overnight rate).”
2   
 
  Although, in general, partially dollarized weak currency economies are likely to suffer 
from  both currency and maturity mismatches, intuitively, countries where the first one is 
prevalent will tend to carefully manage their exchange rates while those where the second 
problem dominates will adapt their monetary policy in order to minimize the real effects of an 
interest rate defense of the exchange rate. Thus, irrespective of the de jure regime reported by the 
country, the de facto exchange rate policy will be to a large degree determined by the relative 
importance of currency and maturity mismatches, and their perceived consequences.
3 
 
  While the literature has tended to focus on the adverse effects of an unexpected nominal 
devaluation in the presence of (bank- or firm-level) currency mismatches, it is essential to note 
that a superfixed regime that successfully prevents a sharp nominal devaluation does not protect 
a country from the balance sheet effects of a real exchange rate (RER) adjustment. On the 
contrary, under a peg, RER overvaluation is corrected through a process of deflation that reduces 
the relative price of non-tradables eroding the capacity to pay of debtors from the non-tradable 
                                                       
1 Examples include De la Torre et al. (2002), Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) and Burnside et al. (2001), in the first case, 
and Calvo (2002), Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Haussman, Panizza and Stein (2001), in the second. By financial 
dollarization we refer to the holding by residents of foreign currency-denominated assets and liabilities. 
2 De la Torre, Levy Yeyati and Schmukler (2002). Argentina is a good example of the first type: in the currency 
board period, financial dollarization was not only tolerated but also fostered by the authorities. A good example of 
the second type is Brazil, where not only dollar intermediation is severely restricted but also interest rate indexation 
has been widely used in the past as a “policy crutch” to bolster financial intermediation in the local currency.  
3 See Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002), and references therein. 
  1sector regardless of the currency of denomination of their loans, in line with Fisher’s (1933) 
classical “debt deflation” argument.  By contrast, in a country without financial dollarization, the 
adjustment to a more depreciated equilibrium RER that comes through nominal depreciation of a 
flexible exchange rate improves (via debt dilution) the capacity to pay of debtors in the non-
tradable sector, partially offsetting the negative impact of the devaluation from the rise in the 
price of tradable inputs.
4 Balance sheet and debt deflation effects can be regarded to a large 
extent as two sides of the same real exchange rate exposure problem in dollarized economies.  
 
In spite of their growing importance in both policy and theoretical debates, the empirical 
relevance of balance sheet and debt deflation effects remains largely an open question. The 
analytical literature contrasts with the scarcity of empirical studies assessing the real magnitude 
of these effects. Among the few available articles, Bleakley and Cowan (2002) analyze the effect 
on investment of holding foreign-currency denominated debt during devaluations using a sample 
of 500 non-financial publicly traded companies from five Latin American countries. They find 
that the expansionary competitiveness effect associated to exchange-rate realignments offsets the 
potential contractive balance sheet effect on investment. They also find that, after depreciations, 
earnings are higher for firms holding more dollar debt, suggesting the presence of investment 
opportunities that arise from the change in relative prices. Thus, the authors conclude that there 
is no severe currency mismatch of output and liabilities. Firms match the currency composition 
of their debt with the exchange rate elasticity of their income. 
 
Forbes (2002) analyzes firm effects on publicly traded companies from 42 countries to 
examine the impact of 12 major currency depreciations. She finds no significant debt effects on 
performance after depreciations (the currency composition of debt is not analyzed), although 
firms with higher debt ratios tend to show lower net income growth. As expected, firms with a 
higher share of foreign sales exposure perform better after depreciations. In the year after 
depreciations, firms show larger growth in market capitalization than in net income suggesting 
that the reallocation of resources forced by devaluations need time to materialize, although these 
effects are anticipated by market values.
5 
 
A series of articles look at the determinants of capital structure and balance sheet effects 
for Mexican companies around the Tequila crisis. Martinez and Werner (2002) find that, during 
the fixed exchange-rate period before the December 1994 crisis, companies show no relationship 
between the currency composition of their debt and output. Instead, under a floating regime after 
the crisis, companies are less likely to show currency mismatches between debt and output. 
These results are contradicted by Aguiar (2002) and Gelos (2003), who find a positive 
relationship between firms’ foreign-currency denominated debt and exports before the Tequila 
crisis. In an related piece, Harvey and Roper (1999), in the context of the Asian crises, presents 
evidence that Asian corporations “bet” on the stability of the exchange rate by favoring less 
                                                       
4 See Obstfeld (2001). Moreover, if the debt bears fixed interest rates (as is usually the case in Argentina), peso debt 
behaves countercyclically, as non-tradable producers benefit from the partial pass-through of a nominal devaluation 
to domestic prices while the debt burden remains constant. Real exchange rate risk, in this case, is born by the 
lender. 
5 Campa and Goldberg (1999) and Nucci and Pozzolo (2001) consider the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on 
investment decisions at the industry and firm level, respectively. They find that positive effects of a depreciation of 
the local currency are associated to larger shares of exports as percentage of total firm production, and negative 
effects are associated to the share of imported inputs. While these studies do not consider balance sheet effects 
directly (and use no financial information), the reported effects of exchange rate suggest that firms are not perfectly 
hedged against exchange rate risk 
  2costly dollar debt at a time of declining profitability, benefiting with higher short–term returns at 
the expense of a larger currency exposure that ultimately exacerbated the extent of the crisis. 
 
Our paper intends to contribute to this growing literature by looking at balance sheet in 
the late years of the Argentine currency board. While most of the literature on balance sheet 
effects focuses on fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate, either under a flexible regime or as 
a result of the collapse of a peg, our study addresses the impact of debt deflation, namely, the 
effect of an adverse external shocks under a peg through changes in the real exchange rate and 
price deflation in the local currency. As price deflation induces increases in the real value of the 
debt regardless of the currency denomination, balance sheet effects through both dollar and peso 
denominated debt are considered in our study.   
 
Our focus lies on two potentially relevant effects stressed by the analytical literature: i) 
the incidence of exchange rate policy on the currency composition of private debt, and ii) the 
incidence of real shocks on firms with real exchange rate exposures. The first issue relates to the 
presence of implicit guarantees provided by fixed exchange rate regimes. The relevant question 
is whether a peg creates an implicit exchange rate guarantee that reduces the firms’ willingness 
to pay the cost of hedging their positions (in the case of non-tradable producers, by paying the 
additional cost of peso funding).
6  
 
The second issue is directly related to the implications of a pegged exchange rate regime 
and to the dilemma between nominal deflation and devaluation (alternatively, debt deflation or 
balance sheet effects) as a response to a substantial RER misalignment. While in principle there 
is a symmetry between the two as both eventually converge to an equilibrium RER level, in 
practical terms there is a tradeoff between gradualism (at the cost of a long recession) and shock 
therapy (at the cost of abrupt financial disruptions). In the Argentine experience analyzed in this 
paper, the effects are entirely generated by the gradual deflation process. By contrast, no 
conclusion can be extracted concerning standard devaluation-related balance sheet effects based 




The map of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the period of analysis and 
provides some basic macroeconomic background. Section 3 presents our data. Section 4 lists the 
hypotheses to be tested empirically. Section 5 describes the methodological approach. Section 6 
discusses the empirical results, and section 7 concludes. 
 
 
                                                       
6 Note that prudential norms in the financial sector limited at the time the exposure to exchange rate risk at the bank 
level, but were completely silent regarding currency mismatches at the firm level. In particular, no discrimination 
was made in relation to the tradable component of debtors’ production mix. From a normative perspective, the 
question intends to explore whether firms in the non-tradable sector internalized the risk associated with a currency 
mismatch between earnings and financial costs. For more general discussions on ways in which a peg may induce 
financial dollarization, see Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003), Burnside, Eichembaum and Rebelo (2001) and Broda and 
Levy Yeyati (2003). See also the discussion of the empirical evidence in Harvey and Roper (1999). 
7 Indeed, the pesification (that is, the compulsory conversion of dollar liabilities at the one-to-one exchange rate) of 
all domestic liabilities that followed the January 2002 devaluation all but eliminated any potential balance sheet 
effect, so that an assessment of the latter in Argentina will remain a speculative issue. A proxy analysis can still be 
conducted based on external corporate exposure, exploiting the fact that external debt could not be unilaterally 
converted. The impact, however, is also muted here, since most of this debt is in the process of being renegotiated 
under the umbrella of the sovereign default and extensive controls to capital transfers. 
  3 
II. Macroeconomic Setting 
 
Exploring the empirical answer to our questions requires the combination of widespread financial 
dollarization with an important variability in both real exchange rate and devaluation 
expectations. The late 1990s in Argentina satisfy these requirements. Dollarization was extensive 
at both sides of the banks’ balance sheet. The real exchange rate went through important 
variations as the steady appreciation of the dollar that characterized the 1990s compounded with 
the stream of devaluations triggered by the Asian crises and the Russian default that led, finally, 
to the devaluation of the Brazilian real in 1999. As a result, the latest Convertibility years 
witnessed a contractionary adjustment through price deflation. Moreover, these external shocks 
fueled sizable and volatile devaluation expectations. We exploit these elements, plus a rich firm-
level panel database, to investigate the response of debt composition and performance to real 
exchange rate changes. Table 1 presents a summary of the major economic and political events 




We analyze the period from 1993 to 2001. The study starts in 1993 as data quality and 
availability becomes poorer for earlier years. Our last observations correspond to 2001, right 
before the devaluation and pesification of loans and deposits that ended the Argentine currency 
board period. Thus, our sample comprises almost all the Convertibility era including the Tequila 
crisis and the final recession that started in 1998. 
 
 




As explained, we study the evolution of companies’ balance sheets from 1993 to 2001. We 
consider annual observations using information from companies’ statements.
9 We restrict our 
sample to non-financial companies. Given that currency mismatches are affected by banking 
regulation, the capital structure of banks is not comparable with the behavior of non-financial 
companies. As our estimation methodology requires the use of lagged variables as instruments, 
we exclude companies for which balances are not available for some intermediate year. To avoid 
having a panel of very short duration, we also exclude companies for which there are less than 
four years of information after 1995. Our sample of firms is composed of three types of 
companies: publicly traded companies, publicly held but not publicly traded companies, and 
privatized companies. 
 
Information from publicly traded companies is available from the Buenos Aires Stock 
Exchange. We consider all the non-financial publicly traded companies for which there is a 
minimum of four observations from contiguous years since 1995. A total of 71 companies satisfy 
these conditions. The data for these publicly traded companies were obtained from the financial 
data company Economatica. 
 
                                                       
8 For a detailed account of the Argentine economy over the currency board period, see Levy Yeyati (2001) and 
references therein. 
9 A table with variable definitions and sources used in the paper is presented in Appendix 2 
  4We also took advantage of the fact that a large number of formerly state-owned 
companies were privatized in Argentina. The privatization process took place during the period 
1990-98. Although most of these companies are not publicly traded, they are obliged to report 
their financial information to the regulatory agencies. We followed the balance sheets presented 
by the privatized companies to the regulatory agencies of the Air Transport, Airports, Electricity, 
Gas, Telecommunications, Water and Sewerage, Railways, and Postal Services sectors. Financial 
data for a total of 56 non-financial privatized companies (with at least four observations for 
contiguous years since 1995) were obtained through this process. 
 
We completed our database tracking data for non-publicly-traded non-privatized 
companies. Some companies, although not publicly traded, present regularly their financial 
information to the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange because they have issued publicly traded debt 
bonds, or because they intend to be publicly traded at some point. Data for 18 non-financial firms 
of this type were obtained directly from the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange. Finally, companies 
that are publicly held but not publicly traded and that incorporated in the city of Buenos Aires 
have to present their annual balances to the General Inspection of Justice (the enforcement of this 
rule is somewhat loose). We requested to this public office the financial information for the top 
100 firms (according to the 2001 ranking of sales of the specialized business magazine Mercado) 
not covered by the other sources of information described above. Data for 57 non-financial non-
publicly traded companies (with at least four observations from contiguous years since 1995) 
were obtained through this procedure. 
 
Thus, our database comprises a total of 202 firms. Table 2 summarizes the number of 
companies and observations available for each year. The panel gets thinner for the first years 
because of data unavailability and because some companies were privatized after 1993. It is also 
thinner for 2001 because of companies’ delays during the 2002 crisis in presenting their financial 
information. the complete list of firms included in the study and the years for which data are 
available for each company are reported in Galiani et al. (2003). 
 
We classify the companies in our sample according to their main sector of economic 
activity (at CIIU-2 digit level). For each of these CIIU sectors we have available a price index 
that will allow us to measure relative price movements. The 202 companies participate in 33 
sectors. We then classify these sectors as tradable or non-tradable according to their production 
composition. We perform this classification at the sector level using information from the 
Argentine national accounts, because company data do not disaggregate between domestic and 
external sales. In Table 3, a firm is classified as tradable if the expo share (the 1993-2001 
average of the ratio of exports over total value added) of its sector of activity is larger than the 
median of the sector export shares across all the companies in our sample.
10 This procedure 
divides our sample in a tradable half and a non-tradable half. 
 
Table 4 reports the summary statistics for all the observations of our sample for selected 
variables of interest splitting the sample between tradable and non-tradable companies. A main 
finding is noteworthy and anticipatory of our results. It appears to be no correlation between the 
tradable nature of firms’ output and the currency composition of their debt. Tradable and non-
tradable companies show very similar debt and dollar-debt ratios.
11 If anything, non-tradable 
                                                       
10 We obtain similar results by classifying our firms as tradable when they belong to the agriculture, mining or 
manufacturing sector, and as non-tradable for the other sectors. 
11 These numbers, in turn, are consistent with the level of financial dollarization observed for the whole economy 
(Figure A3). 
  5firms display a slightly higher level of debt dollarization. This contrasts with what one would 
expect in the absence of exchange rate guarantees and given the deflationary period of the late 
1990s. On the other hand, the table reveals that tradable producers were favored by the relative 
price changes over the period. Prices followed the GDP deflator very closely for the tradable 
sectors, while they displayed a decline of around 10% for the non-tradable sector. 
 
There is also little difference concerning the other variables. Companies in both sectors 
seem to have, on average, similar size according to assets. The evolution of sales over assets was 
similar across sectors. During the period of analysis, non-tradable companies show larger 
investment and earnings. By construction, the export (and import) shares of the firms classified 
as tradable producers are obviously larger than for the non-tradables. Table 5 presents the same 
data in more detail, ordering sectors according to their export content. Again, no apparent pattern 
appears relating tradable content of the production mix and dollar debt ratios (the correlation 
coefficient between these two variables is a mere 8.8%). 
 
Measurement of Real Exchange Rate Exposure and Debt Deflation 
Key to our analysis is the definition and measurement of firms’ RER exposure. This variable 
should tell us how firms’ value changes in the event of a devaluation. However, this definition 
combines stock and flow effects that are crucial in the estimation of value. Regarding stocks, the 
RER exposure depends heavily on the liability side of the balance sheet, given that domestic 
firms typically hold non-tradable physical assets. However, it is in the flow dimension (related 
with the company’s income statement) where the debt deflation effect is more deleterious, as 
dollarized firms with income only marginally correlated with the nominal exchange rate or, more 
generally, with income sensitive to fluctuations in the real exchange rate, are more likely to face 
a financial constraint that may limit its operations and eventually precipitate bankruptcy.
12 On 
the flow dimension, the real exchange rate exposure has to take into account not only the 
currency composition of debt (which determines the peso value of their financing expenses) but 
also the composition of its production mix. In light of this, we understand the real exchange rate 
exposure of a firm under a peg as the sensitivity of net income to changes in the real exchange 
rate.  
 
Given the available data, we measure this exposure operationally combining debt 
composition and export orientation (under the realistic assumption that the dollar price of 
tradables is less sensitive to changes in the real exchange rate). The former is computed at firm 
level as the dollar-to-total debt (Dollar Ratio). For the latter, we compute the export content 
(measured as the export-to-value added ratio, or Expo) for the 33 sectors comprised in our 
database (at CIIU-2 digit level), and assign firms to these sectors according to their production 
mix.  Thus, a firm will have a larger RER exposure the larger the dollar share of its debt, and the 
smaller the export component of its predominant sector. We also compute and use import content 
(Impo) in the same way. However, this variable should be treated with caution. First, a sector 
may use imported inputs that are purchased from retailers in the domestic market. Second, firms 
with high import-content inputs may compete with imported final products in the domestic 
market. Although they will be hit by the relative price adjustment that follows a devaluation, 
these firms may, at the same time, benefit from weaker competition from more expensive rival 
imports. 
 
                                                       
12 As noted before, firms with tradable (but not traded) output may also suffer from imperfect dollar indexation, as 
domestic prices of tradables adjust to international ones only gradually. 
  6Debt deflation, in turn, is measured in two indirect ways. First, we follow the evolution of 
the real effective exchange rate (RER) during the period, as a proxy for exchange rate 
misalignments that are corrected over time through relative price adjustments. A fall in the RER 
would then be associated with the presence of debt deflation. Second, we use Deflator, computed 
as the price index of the sector normalized by the GDP deflator, to measure relative price 
movements across sectors of different degrees of tradability. Thus, a fall in this variable 
(alternatively, a negative change in the ratio between the sector and the aggregate price deflators) 
would be associated with an adverse relative price adjustment. This allows us not only to follow 
actual relative price changes but also to observe the extent to which adverse real exchange rate 
shocks are accommodated through nominal deflation. More precisely, we are able to test 
whether, in the event of a negative real shock, less tradable sectors are hit by a decline in relative 
prices. 
 
Finally, devaluation expectations are proxied by the peso-dollar interest rate spread (from 
interbank lending rates).
13 We also use RER (a signal of impending relative price adjustments) as 
an alternative. As noted, devaluation expectations are key to explain a differential response as a 
function of debt currency composition in a context in which expectations of an exchange rate 








Under Convertibility, dollar and peso debt in Argentina only differed in that the former has 
higher risk and lower financing costs than the latter. A key question regarding the impact of 
financial dollarization is, then, which of these countervailing aspects dominated. More precisely, 
we hypothesize that: 
 
H1: In the absence of (explicit or implicit) exchange rate guarantees, debt currency 
composition should reflect the currency composition of the debtor’s income. Firms in 
sectors with a larger tradable component should display a larger dollar debt share. 
 
Moreover, it was widely believed (as witness the presence of a persistent and highly 
volatile currency premium) that there was a positive probability of abandoning the currency 
board, which, in the absence of exchange rate guarantees, should have deterred non-tradable 
producers from dollarizing their funding sources. Thus, again in the absence of guarantees, an 
increase in devaluation expectations, as reflected in larger currency premiums, should have 
raised the risk associated with exchange rate exposure and moved (partially) unhedged (i.e., 
currency mismatched) debtors to reduce it. In this regard,  
 
H1a: Absent (explicit or implicit) exchange rate guarantees, devaluation expectations 
should lead firms to reduce their real exchange rate exposure. The (positive) relationship 
between loan dollarization and the tradable component of the production mix of the 
debtor should strengthen as devaluation expectations increase. 
                                                       
13 Our results are unaffected if alternatively we use the deposit rate (highly correlated, albeit less sensitive, than its 
interbank counterpart). 
14 Although we do not derive them from a formal model, these hypotheses, which encompass different ideas usually 
presented in policy and analytical discussions, are a useful guide to orient our empirical exploration. 
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Finally, in the particular case of Argentina, there is an additional aspect that may have 
played a role in the currency composition of debt, namely, the fact that most privatized 
companies in regulated sectors were legally endowed an explicit exchange rate guarantee 
through indexation of their rates to the United States’ Consumer Price Index. While the 
preservation of dollar indexation in the event of a sizeable devaluation may have been an 
unrealistic assumption, it could be argued that companies with dollarized prices should have 
mirror more closely the behavior of tradable producers. To check this in the data, we test whether 
hypotheses H1 and H1a cease to hold for privatized companies with dollar-indexed prices. 
 
Real Exchange Rate Adjustment and Debt Deflation 
In the presence of (limited) nominal flexibility under a peg, an adverse external shock should 
have induced an accommodating relative price adjustment hitting non-tradable producers more 
than tradable producers. This is, in essence, the mechanism through which debt deflation 
materializes in practice. Accordingly, we expect that the real exchange rate misalignment that 
resulted from the successive adverse shocks that characterized the Argentine economy during the 
late 1990s should have reflected in a deterioration of the relative performance of non-tradable 
producers. In particular, we expect the RER adjustment to show in both relative price deflation 
and a fall in demand (sales), affecting the firm’s returns and, through this channel, the investment 
performance. This prior leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The impact of an RER adjustment through debt deflation on firm performance is 
positively correlated with the non-tradable component of the production mix of the 
debtor. 
 
On the other hand, one could argue that, due to the presence of a persistent “peso 
problem,” dollar debtors indeed benefited in good times from (sometimes substantially) lower 
financing costs, which eventually showed in a better performance and, through this channel, 
additional internal funds to finance new investment.
15 Thus, once debt deflation is controlled for, 
a higher dollar debt ratio may be found to be positively (rather than negatively as conventional 
wisdom would indicate) correlated with firm’s returns and investment. In line with this, we test 
the following: 
 
H2a: In the absence of a nominal devaluation, debt dollarization is positively correlated 
with performance.  
 
Firms’ Expectations and Anticipated Debt Deflation 
As noted, many of the existing studies on balance sheet effects assume that investment reacts ex-
post to changes in the exchange rate. While this is true under a flexible regime where the 
exchange rate supposedly reflect all the information currently available, devaluation expectations 
under a peg may precede actual changes in the nominal exchange rate, thus inducing an 
anticipatory reaction in investments plans. Indeed, even if the negative expectations do not 
materialize, lack of confidence could induce firms to react, cutting investment plans 
preemptively. In either case, the probability of a devaluation (rather than shocks in fundamentals 
or even relative price adjustments) should be the key control variable. 
 
                                                       
15 By good times we refer to the years in which devaluation expectations were not confirmed by real fundamentals 
and deflation was not already at play.  
  8H3: Investment was negatively correlated with devaluation expectations, the more so the 
higher the firms’ real exchange rate exposure. 
 
 




We first consider estimation methods for the simple AR(1) model:  
 
T 1,..., t N; 1,..., i ; 1 | | ); ( 1 = = < + + = − α ε µ α it i it it y y  (1) 
 
where  µi is an unobserved firm-specific time-invariant effect, and εit is a disturbance term 
independent across firms. The asymptotic analysis assumes that T is fixed. As it is well known, 
both the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Least Square Dummy Variables (LSDV) estimators 
of α are inconsistent. Standard results for omitted variable bias indicate that, at least in large 
samples, the OLS estimator is biased upward and the LSDV estimator is biased downwards. The 
fact that these two estimators are likely to be biased in opposite directions is useful since a 
consistent estimator must lie between the OLS and the LSDV estimates, or at least not be 
significantly higher than the former or significantly lower than the latter (see Bond, 2002). We 
exploit this result in the ensuing analysis to check for the validity of our estimates.  
 
An alternative method to eliminate µi consist in first differencing equation (1). Note, 
nonetheless, that, after differencing, yit-1 is correlated with the differenced equation error, ∆εit. 
Arellano and Bond (1991; AB) propose an efficient (among its class) linear estimator that is 
consistent even in panels with small and fixed T.  They note that, as long as εit is serially 
uncorrelated, all lags of y beyond t-1 are valid instrument for the differenced equation in period t. 
Consequently, a consistent estimator of the parameters of interest is obtained by using 
appropriately lagged variables as instruments.
16 
 
Generically, in this paper we adopt a dynamic specification for our empirical models and 
postulate dynamic two-way fixed effects error component models of the following general form:  
 
it i t it it it x y y ε µ λ β ϕ + + + − = − L) ( 1                (2) 
 
where xit is a vector of covariates that varies both across firms and time (possible including 
interaction terms between aggregate and firm level variables), and where β(L) is a lag-
polynomial at most of order 1.  
 
                                                       
16 The consistency of the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) depends crucially on the absence 
of serial correlation in εit. If the disturbance εit is not serially correlated, there should be evidence of significant 
negative first order serial correlation in the differenced residuals, but there should not be any evidence of second 
order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Arellano and Bond (1991) develop tests for first and second 
order correlation in the differenced residuals. These tests are asymptotically standard normal distributed under the 
null hypothesis of no serial correlation. More generally, they propose to rely on Sargan tests of overidentifying 
restrictions to evaluate the specification of the estimated model. The Sargan test is asymptotically distributed Chi-
squared under the null hypothesis of no correlation among the instruments and the residuals of the transformed 
model. 
  9Different moment conditions will be available depending on what is assumed about the 
correlation between xit and the components of the error term. We consider two cases here. First, 
let xit to be strictly exogenous in the sense that is uncorrelated with all past, present and future 
realizations of εit. However, in this case, we do not exploit the extra moment conditions available 
to instrument the lagged dependent variable in the transformed model.
17 Second, let xit to be 
endogenous in the sense that is correlated with present (and past) realizations of εit  but is 
uncorrelated with all future realizations of the disturbance term. In this latter case, xit is treated 
symmetrically with the dependent variable yit. Again, in this case, we do not exploit all the 
moment conditions available to instrument the endogenous x’s regressors in the transformed 
model.  
 
In what follows we report OLS, LSDV and AB estimates. We also report Sargan, AR(1) 
and AR(2) tests. All GMM estimates are optimal two-step ones (see Hansen, 1982). We always 






Based on our baseline specification (1), the test of our capital structure hypotheses H1 and H1a 
on the effect of the currency composition of income on the currency composition of debt takes as 
dependent variable the dollar-to-total-debt ratio (Dollar Ratio) and includes as controls: lagged 
real sales (to control for firm size), year effects (to control for common macroeconomic factors), 
and firm effects (to control for firm-specific characteristics). In addition, we use the sector export 
share measures (Expo) to control for export orientation.
19 Both dynamic and cross-section results 
will be reported. While the former would indicate how currency debt composition varies with 
changes in export content, these changes are likely to be small during the sample period. In 
particular, they display smaller variability over time than across firms. Thus, we expect any 
correlation between production mix and debt composition to be more visible using a cross 
section approach. 
 
Both CRISK (currency risk) and RER (real effective exchange rate) are used to control for 
devaluation expectations. We expect non-export oriented firms to de-dollarize their liabilities as 
these expectations worsen. Hence, we interact the expectation variables with the export share to 
test whether the sensitivity of debt composition (if there is any) is correlated with the non-
tradable content of the firms’ output mix.  
 
To test for the impact of debt deflation on firm behavior (H2) we use two performance 
measures: the sales-to-assets ratio (Sales) and the earning-to-asset ratio (Earnings). In the 
regressions we control for time and fixed effects, and for the firm’s leverage ratio (lagged). In 
addition, we use the Expo, RER, and CRISK, and their interactions. Finally, we include the sector 
deflators (Deflator) to tests the incidence of expectations, which may be traced to the 
incremental effect of currency risk on investment once relative price measures are controlled for. 
 
                                                       
17 There is always a trade-off when applying an instrumental variable estimator. We want to obtain estimates that are 
as efficient as possible while avoiding small finite-sample bias.  
18 The standard two-step procedure would yield biased estimators of the standard errors in samples of our size.  
19 We also include the lagged export share for robustness. Import shares (Impo), also tested, did not yield significant 
results and were omitted for brevity. All ommited results are available from the authors upon request.  
  10We expect a negative real shock to affect non-tradable producers both through quantities 
and prices. Thus, when Sales and, after controlling for the latter, Earnings are our dependent 
variables, we expect that the coefficient of the interaction of RER with Expo to be positive. In 
both cases, we also include Deflator to control for the incidence of relative price variations on 
earnings. Here, we expect the coefficient to be negative.  
 
Note also that hypothesis H2a would imply that, once other measures of price deflation 
are included, the coefficient corresponding to the dollar debt ratio would be positive in the 
performance regressions. Indeed, if investment reacts a posteriori to performance (for example, 
due to the access to internal funds of financially constrained firms), investment may also respond 
positively to dollar ratios in good times, given that dollar debt was, ex-post, less costly for 
Argentine firms during the period of analysis. We include Dollar Ratio (lagged) in the earnings 
regression to test this in the data. 
 
Finally, we run regressions of (net) purchases of physical capital (Investment) on the 
previous set of controls, including both sales and earnings in the preceding period to test our H3 
hypothesis on the effect of devaluation expectations on investment. We expect these coefficients 
to have a positive sign reflecting the incidence of the availability of internal funds.  
 
 
VI. Empirical Results 
 
Tables 6 and 7 report the results on firms’ debt composition and test our capital structure 
hypotheses. Tables 8 to 10 test the impact of real shocks on sales, earnings and investment in 
physical capital, as a function of the firms’ export content and the evolution of relative prices, as 
well as the impact of devaluation expectations on investment.  
 
Regarding the former, Tables 6 and 7 consistently show that the dollarization of corporate 
debt in convertible Argentina did not exhibit any relation with the tradable nature of the firms. 
There is no relationship either with the impending price adjustment as the RER fell during the 
last part of the decade. Table 6 presents a simple cross-section estimation of our baseline 
specification (including leverage ratio, firm size measured by assets, and export orientation as 
explanatory variables) using firm averages over the sample period. The results reveal a positive 
and significant association between the debt dollar ratio and both firm size and indebtedness. On 
the contrary, export orientation is negatively, albeit not significantly, related with debt 
dollarization, contradicting hypothesis H1 on the relationship between output and debt 
composition (column 2). As noted, many privatized companies were benefited by an explicit 
exchange rate guarantee in the form of dollar indexation of their tariffs. However, controlling for 
the presence of dollarized producers of services does not alter the results. Indeed, the coefficient 
for dollarized prices, while positive as expected, is not statistically significant (column 3). 
 
Table 7 presents a fully specified dynamic model. We first present OLS and LSDV 
estimates of the parameters of interest as a check of the GMM estimates. As discussed in the 
previous section, consistent estimates of the coefficient of the dependent lagged variable must 
stretch out within the LSDV and OLS estimates. The GMM estimates we report exploit the 




Coefficients differ as expected, with OLS closer to our cross-section estimates, and the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable estimated by AB lying between LSDV and OLS. 
We also report several specification tests. First, in all specifications, we test for the joint 
significance of the year effects. We also report the GMM estimates Sargan tests and the tests of 
first and second order autocorrelation of the transformed residuals as proposed in Arellano and 
Bond (1991). No sign of concern about the identification assumptions of the estimator used is 
reveled for any of these tests.  
 
While the findings indicate that dollar ratios increase with leverage and size (possibly 
reflecting that firms need to reach a certain scale to gain access to the international capital 
markets), the evidence of a correlation between export orientation and debt dollarization is, at 
best, weak. The coefficient is positive in most of the specifications but barely significant only 
when estimated using fixed effects. In fact, once the model is consistently identified, by means of 
a GMM method (column 3), the sign of the Expo coefficient falls strongly suggesting the 
rejection of H1.
21 Note that  we do not reject the hypothesis that the year effects are jointly equal 
to zero. In columns 4 and 5 we remove the year effects from the model and include the RER and 
CRISK measures. The estimated coefficients for these variables are not statistically significant. 
Since they do not span the same subspace that the year effects, we also test the exclusion 
restriction imposed. We do not reject it for any of the specifications reported.    
 
It could be argued, however, that this specification biases our results towards lack of 
significance by bunching hedged exporters (for which currency risk should have been neutral) 
with unhedged non-tradable producers. To address this concern, in columns 6 to 9 we test 
whether the correlation between devaluation expectations and dollarization is stronger for the 
latter, interacting RER and CRISK with export orientation (similar results are obtained using the 
average export-content ratio over the period; see Galiani et al, 2003). Coefficients are positive as 
expected (with dollarization falling in relative terms with currency risk for firms with lower 
export orientation) but not significant. Again, none of the specification tests reported warns 
against our identification assumptions.   
 
In sum, both hypotheses H1 and H1a are rejected by the data. Debt dollarization appears 
to have been a widespread phenomenon that did not respond to export orientation (or, for that 
matter, price indexation), nor was the result of positive devaluation expectation, as it is attested 
by the lack of sensitivity, both in general and for real exchange rate-exposed firms in particular, 
to currency risk (which varied dramatically over the period). At any rate, these findings only 
confirm the intuition provided by our first glance at the data, which revealed very high levels of 
debt dollarization regardless of the sector of activity. 
 
  Tables 8 to 10 address the link between debt deflation and firm performance. As noted, in 
Table 8 we run regressions of the sales-to-asset ratio on the relative price deflator and the firm’s 
export orientation. Again, results conform to econometric theory. In column (3), the Sargan test 
                                                       
20 All available lags of the dependent variables are used as instruments. We also check the validity of these estimates 
by exploiting additional moment conditions as suggested in Blundell and Bond (1999). Results were always quite 
similar.  
21 The smaller coefficients obtained using using lagged values of Expo (ommited here for conciseness) further 
support this conclusion. See Galiani et al. (2003). 
  12suggests that at least one of the moment conditions exploited by the estimator used is rejected by 
the data at the 5 percent level. Thus, in column 4 we treat both expo and deflator as endogenous 
variables. Results, however, are almost identical. The deflator displays, as expected, a positive 
coefficient (with favorable relative price changes increasing income), significant in most 
specifications. Thus, this finding, combined with the fact that the evolution of relative prices 
during the period of analysis negatively affected non-export oriented firms (Table 4), provides 
support to the view that a deflationary adjustment to a more depreciated real exchange rate 
tended to burden primarily non-tradable producers.  
 
  Deflation, in turn, affects firm earnings through a decline in income, as shown in the 
models reported in Table 9. The deflator coefficient is positive and significant when introduced 
alone (column 3), but loses explanatory power once sales are controlled for (column 4). No 
direct effect from real exchange rate changes is detected beyond their impact on relative prices as 
reflected in the sector deflator. The dollar debt ratio allows us to test H2b, namely, that a high 
dollar debt ratio in the preceding period, while ex-ante a one-sided bet for non-tradable 
producers exposed to RER changes, was profitable as long as a nominal devaluation did not 
materialize. Thus, debt dollarization may have enhanced, rather than hampered, firm 
performance through lower realized financing costs. The findings in Table 10 are consistent with 
this view. Larger dollar debt ratios are positively and significantly correlated with earnings in 
most specifications.22 
 
  Table 10 moves on to test the impact on investment. While the results indicate that 
deflation did have an effect on investment performance through its effect on earnings, other 
controls do not have additional significant incidence. Our baseline specification controls for 
profits, which as expected, display a positive and, in some regressions, significant coefficient. On 
the other hand, deflator and the dollar ratio either fail to be significant or display the wrong sign. 
 
  Finally, columns 4 to 7 address hypothesis H3 about the effect of devaluation 
expectations on investment behavior. Given the degree of debt dollarization, an increase in the 
perceived probability of a nominal devaluation should lead to changes in investment that are 
positively correlated with the export content of the firm, with larger content associated with 
larger investment expansions. Hence, the interaction between the expectation variable and export 
content should be positive. In turn, given export orientation, devaluation expectations should 
lead to changes in investment that are negatively correlated with the level of debt dollarization, 
with larger dollar ratios associated with smaller investment expansions.  Hence, the interaction 
between the expectations variable and the debt dollar share should be negative.  
 
As the table shows, the results are mixed. On the one hand, the real exchange rate (our 
proxy for devaluation expectations) does not exhibit any significant differential effect across 
sectors with varying export orientations (indeed, it displays the wrong sign), in line with findings 
in the previous tables and contradicting H3. On the other, increases in currency risk do appear to 
have exerted a significantly negative effect on investment decisions by more financially 
dollarized firms (column 7).  
 
One possible explanation for these findings points at the anticipation of a low initial pass-
through even for producers of tradables that are partially sold in domestic markets, as the market 
substitution process induced by the change in relative prices takes time. If so, the distinction 
                                                       
22 This results are in line with the higher profitability of dollar-indebted Asian corporations reported in Harvey and 
Roper (1999). 
  13tradable-nontradable would lead to an imperfect measure of the short-run real exchange rate 
exposure of the firm and, with a few exceptions (e.g. producers of traded commodities) 
devaluation expectations would impinge on the cash flows of all dollarized firms and, through 
this channel, on their investment plans. Note that this would reduce even further the scope for 
financial dollarization in a hedged environment. At any rate, this hypothesis deserves more 
careful empirical examination. 
 
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
 
Using the specific case of Argentina, this paper helps illuminate the implications of a pegged 
exchange rate regime in two different dimensions, namely, the relation between a peg and the 
capital structure of the firm, and the distribution of the adjustment to real shocks while the peg is 
in place. On the former, we found that debt dollarization was the rule rather than the exception, 
and it born no relationship to the firm’s production mix or the ever-changing probability of a 
sudden nominal devaluation. While the actual presence of an implicit guarantee cannot be 
directly tested in the data, the results reported here are broadly consistent to the conventional 
view that non-tradable producers disregarded real exchange rate exposures even during periods 
of sizable currency risk.  
 
  Two comments are in order concerning the previous point. First, we are ignoring the 
behavior of the supply side of the credit market. In particular, there is some anecdotal evidence 
that, in Argentina, access to peso funding was limited, the more so the higher the currency risk. 
However, while this could explain the resilience of dollarization ratios to changes in 
expectations, it does not detract from the fact that a simple cross section shows a negative, albeit 
not significant, correlation between these ratios and export orientation that is not driven by 
exchange rate-protected privatized companies. 
 
  The impact of debt deflation, while weaker, is still visible in the data. Relative price 
changes, which, due to the protracted deflation that characterized the period under analysis, 
favored export-oriented firms, had the expected impact on sales and earnings and, through the 
latter, on investment. Moreover, there is some evidence that dollarized firms benefited from 
lower financing costs during the convertibility period. This finding is not trivial, as financial 
costs (combined with a wrong incentive design) appear to have been an important factor 
contributing to the reluctance of financial officers to hedge their exposures.  
 
  Finally, and in line with the result on the currency choice, increases in devaluation 
expectations did not elicit any differential response on investment from those firms more 
exposed to real exchange rate risk, either through a large debt dollarization ratio or through a 
limited export orientation.   
 
  In sum, the core results of the paper seem in line with two criticisms that the Argentine 
currency board received in recent years. First, that by fueling beliefs in an implicit guarantee it 
stimulated dollarization across the board, even in a context of varying and recurrently high 
devaluation expectations. Second, that while it could postpone the real exchange adjustment over 
time, it could not completely isolate the economy from real shocks: the feared balance sheet 
effects were replaced by less dramatic but equally deleterious debt deflation effects. 
 
  14  Unfortunately, the discussion on balance sheet versus debt deflation effects is unlikely to 
be settled based on the Argentine case. On the one hand, the full impact of debt deflation cannot 
be assessed empirically because the devaluation interrupted what otherwise would have been a 
much longer contractionary process. On the other, after the devaluation, balance sheet effects 
materialized only to a very limited extent, as all domestic liabilities were compulsorily converted 
to the local currency at the exchange rate prevailing under the currency board. Nonetheless, the 
evidence presented here supports the concerns about the externalities associated with financial 
dollarization and the need to address the issue from a prudential perspective. Needless to say, the 
implication of any prudential norm requires an analysis of the supply side of the credit market, 
which would be the natural complement to the research presented in this paper. 
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  17Table 1. Argentina: Chronology of Major Economic and Political Events 
 
Date Events 
199103  Convertibility Law (fixed exchange rate to dollar and abolished all exchange and 
capital controls). 
199108  Law protecting dollar denominated deposits enacted. 
199110  Decree ordering reform of the state, including deregulation of financial market. 
199304  Brady Plan agreement. 
199307  Oil company (YPF) privatized as part of large privatization program. Second largest 
equity offering by a developing country and one of the largest in the world. 
199407  New pension system began operating. 
199412  Mexican Tequila crisis.  
199500  Banking crises: suspension of 8 banks and collapse of 3 banks. A limited system of 
deposit insurance was introduced in response to the banking crisis. 
199505  Re-election of President Menem after constitutional reform. 
199607  Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo ousted. 
199710  Heavy selling in Hong Kong caused a domino effect in other emerging market. 
199805  Concern over the turmoil in Asian economies, financial problems in Russia. 
199901  Devaluation of the Brazilian real. 
199905  Macroeconomic figures were weak. GDP contracted 3.0% and unemployment rose to 
14.5%. Export to Brazil declined significantly.  
199910  President de la Rua elected, ending President Carlos Menem's 10-year Peronist party 
rule. 
200010  Political crisis after allegations that a number of senators received bribes in exchange 
for backing a labor reform. Vice President Alvarez resigned. The country failed to 
meet its IMF-mandated fiscal targets due to slower third-quarter growth and high 
interest rates. Spreads on its FRB Bonds increased to more than 600 basis points. 
200011  S&P lowered Argentina's local and foreign currency sovereign credit ratings. IMF-led 
coalition announced a US$39.7 billion aid package to prevent a debt crisis. 
200012 IMF  bailout. 
200103  Deteriorated fiscal situation forced two economy ministers to resign and Domingo 
Cavallo took over as Economy Minister. 
200106  A market-based solution was sought for the government's near inability to service debt 
by swapping US$29.5 billion of short-term obligations for long-term bonds. Beginning 
of huge withdraws from the banking system. 
200109  US$8 billion IMF bailout package failed to prevent double-digit drops in tax revenues. 
200111  S&P lowered Argentina's sovereign rating to default status. The government imposed 
restrictions on deposit outflows and capital flight. 
200112  Citizens protested the newly restructured government bonds and lack of access to bank 
deposits. Mr. Cavallo and President de la Rua resigned. Three more interim leaders 
followed before Eduardo Duhalde became president. End of Convertibility: debt 
default and currency devaluation. 
Source: Extracts from Bekaert and Harvey, Chronology of Economic, Political and Financial 
Events in Emerging Markets, available at http://www.duke.edu/~charvey 





Table 2. Panel Structure 
 




companies  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  TOTAL 
               
Always Private               
    Publicly  Traded  54  45 50 53 54 54 54 54 54 49  467 
    Non-Publicly  Traded  75  46 55 61 66 68 75 75 75 67  588 
  129 91  105 114 120 122 129 129 129  116 1055 
               
Privatized               
    Publicly  Traded  17  11 13 15 16 17 17 17 17 17  140 
    Non-Publicly  Traded  56  20 28 35 40 54 56 56 55 53  397 
  73  31 41 50 56 71 73 73 72 70  537 
               
TOTAL 202  122 146 164 176 193 202 202 201  186  1592 
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Table 3. Tradable and Non-Tradable Companies 
 
Number of observations 
Firms  Number  
of companies  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 TOTAL 
               
Tradable  104  78 89 93 98 98  104  104  104  96  864 
Non-tradable  98  44 57 71 78 95 98 98 97 90  728 
               
TOTAL  202  122 146 164 176 193 202 202 201 186  1592 
 
Note: A firm is classified as tradable if the export share (average of the ratio of exports over total added value over the 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Tradables    Non-Tradables 
   Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
           
Total Debt*  50.5%  48.7%  50.7%  50.6% 
Dollar Debt**  55.1%  62.0%  57.9%  64.4% 
Log Assets  18.84  18.89  18.99  19.06 
Investment in Physical Capital*  4.0%  2.6%  8.0%  4.1% 
Purchases of Physical Capital*  5.3%  3.4%  8.8%  4.7% 
Sales* 88.9%  73.8%  85.9%  55.7% 
Earnings* 9.3%  7.1%  15.7%  11.4% 
Expo  Share  42.7% 32.6% 0.5%  0.02% 
Impo Share  115.0%  35.0%  1.6%  0.03% 
Deflator (interperiod variation) -0.9%  -0.4%  -10.8%  -21.6% 
              
Notes: A firm is classified as tradable if the expo share (1993-2001 average of the ratio of exports over 
total added value) of its sector of activity is larger than the median of the sector export shares across all 
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2  30  Computer Equipments  82.7% 89.4%       18.7               
               
             
           
               
           
               
             
           
           
               
                     
11.4% 2649.0% 102.7% 9.4% 129.9% 16.6% -48.6%
8  34  Automobile  68.6% 59.9%       19.7  5.6%  135.9%  113.5%  6.3%  83.1%  6.0%  -7.8% 
2  19  Leather  62.0% 60.3%       18.8  -2.4%  19.6%  56.6%  6.0%  76.2%  2.4%  0.7% 
21  15  Food and Beverage  50.3% 50.2%       19.1 5.0% 8.9% 104.9% 12.7% 68.4% 6.2% -0.4%
3  27  Metals  40.3% 63.1%       20.3  4.2%  55.7%  66.4%  9.1%  64.7%  4.5%  -7.8% 
2  16  Tobacco  44.1% 12.7%       19.5  4.4% 6.4% 104.8% 22.5% 49.0% 5.9% 6.5%
9  11  Oil and Gas  54.5% 71.4%       20.6  7.8% 3.6% 40.4% 15.1% 38.6%  9.8% 31.0%
8  1  Agriculture and Livestock  66.3% 73.5%       18.6 2.7% 3.6% 158.0% 7.8% 30.5% 3.7% -22.4%
17  24  Chemicals  51.9% 49.8%       18.4  3.1% 76.7% 110.1% 10.6% 28.5%  4.2% 12.2%
1  31  Electrical Equipments  21.5% 27.2%       15.1 0.4% 177.9% 75.0% 4.6% 28.0% 0.4% -19.9%
2  17  Textile  31.6% 64.5%       17.1  4.7% 34.5% 61.1% 7.0% 24.9% 6.1% -11.7%
6  29  Other Machinery  31.7% 30.0%       16.7  -0.1%  157.5%  50.4%  0.0%  24.3%  1.5%  -5.1% 
8  21  Paper  35.9% 38.3%       18.9  2.1% 59.0% 41.9% 5.7% 18.1%  2.7% 2.4%
1  2  Wood Extraction  22.2% 55.5%       17.3  -3.8%  2.3%  18.1%  -1.1%  15.7%  1.3%  -16.9% 
3  32  Radio and Television Equipments  81.5% 79.1%       17.4  6.1%  428.4%  112.6%  2.8%  15.6%  7.7%  -48.6% 
3  25  Rubber, Plastics  47.0% 69.3%       18.1  6.1% 36.3% 88.0% 10.5% 10.7%  7.3% 14.0%
2  28  Metal Products  30.1% 63.9%       21.1  3.5%  39.4%  53.6%  9.8%  8.3%  4.0%  -0.9% 
6  26  Mineral non metallic  34.7% 56.7%       18.8 4.5% 22.5% 48.5% 8.4% 8.3% 5.0% -8.1%
Non-Tradable Sectors 
1  20  Wood products  37.4% 58.0%       17.9  3.7%  11.2%  48.2%  8.7%  4.9%  6.9%  -9.1% 
47  40  Gas, Electricity, Steam and Water supply  37.6% 66.2%       19.2  6.8%  2.7%  41.3%  10.6%  0.8%  7.3%  -21.6% 
2  92  Sporting and Cultural Activities  60.3% 64.3%       18.3  6.9%  0.1%  64.1%         
               
14.7% 0.2% 7.0% -20.3%
1  41  Water Distribution  70.1% 75.8%       20.6  23.8%  0%  49.2%  18.5%  0%  23.9%  24.2% 
5  45  Construction  49.8% 43.6%       18.0  2.7%  0%  65.9%  8.7%  0%  3.7%  -9.8% 
2  50  Car sale, manteinance and reparation  45.9% 72.5%       20.9  6.6%  0%  91.2%  9.9%  0%  8.5%  -8.6% 
3  51  Wholesale  61.9% 43.0%       17.9  3.4%  0%  307.2%  9.2%  0%  4.1%  -2.9% 
7  52  Retailing  62.0% 42.9%       19.1  16.0%  0%  179.7%  7.3%  0%  17.8%  -3.5% 
11  60  Road Transport  71.4% 36.3%       17.6  10.5%  0%  117.1%  55.6%  0%  11.3%  20.3% 
2  62  Air Transport  87.4% 70.2%       19.2  16.0%  0%  113.0%  2.3%  0%  21.9%  34.0% 
2  63  Travel Agency  70.1% 61.6%       20.1  8.2%  0%  27.8%  6.4%  0%  8.2%  38.1% 
10  64  Post Offices and Telecommunications  59.0% 66.1%       20.5  8.1%  0%  60.2%  14.9%  0%  8.8%  -28.4% 
1  65  Real Estate and Financial Services  25.7% 91.2%       19.7  0.5%  0%  12.3%  3.3%  0%  0.7%  -15.1% 
1  70  Real Estate  45.1% 80.5%       19.1 13.5% 0% 7.1% 3.9% 0% 13.6% 7.5%
3  85  Health and Social Services  75.9% 17.2%       17.4  2.1%  0%  429.8%  3.6%  0%  2.6%  2.1% 
                       
Notes: * Ratios over total assets / ** Ratios over total debt. 1 Ratio exports/value added for each sector / 2 Ratio imports/value added for each sector / 3 Variation over 1993-2001.
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202 202 202 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** Statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level of significance. 
** Statistically different from zero at the 0.05 level of significance. * Statistically different from zero at the 0.1 level of 
significance.   
  23Table 7. Dependent Variable: Dollar Ratio 
























































































RER (t)              0.0004 
(0.0011) 
 

















             0.0057
(0.0055) 








              0.8246 0.5245
Sargan Test                    0.527 0.609 0.397 0.518 0.519 0.507 0.513
AR (1)                    0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
AR (2)                    0.373 0.420 0.205 0.372 0.202 0.375 0.193
Number of 
Observations  1390                  1390 1188 1188 1066 1188 1066 1188 1066
Number of 
Firms  202                  202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time series heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. The GMM estimates are all two-
step estimates. The values of the coefficient and standard errors for Real Sales are multiplied by 100,000,000. Standard errors are corrected for finite sample bias 
following Windmeijer (2002). For the Sargan, AR(1) and AR(2) tests, the statistic reported is the p-value. *** Statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level of 
significance. ** Statistically different from zero at the 0.05 level of significance. * Statistically different from zero at the 0.1 level of significance.   
  24Table 8. Dependent Variable: Sales Ratio 
 






































Year Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Exclusion Restrictions: 
Year Effects  0.0001        0.0000 0.0001 0.0114
Sargan Test         0.038 0.165
AR (1)         0.007 0.009
AR (2)         0.869 0.873
Number of Observations 1390        1390 1188 1188
Number of Firms  202        202 202 202
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time series heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. The GMM estimates are all two-step estimates. 
Standard errors are corrected for finite sample bias following Windmeijer (2002). For the Sargan, AR(1) and AR(2) tests, the statistic reported is the p-value. *** Statistically 
different from zero at the 0.01 level of significance. ** Statistically different from zero at the 0.05 level of significance. * Statistically different from zero at the 0.1 level of 
significance.  
  25Table 9. Dependent Variable: Earnings Ratio 







































































Expo*RER (t)         -0.0004 
(0.0020) 
Year  Effects            Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclusion Restrictions: 
Year Effects  0.0002          0.0001 0.0001 0.0009 0.0015
Sargan Test            0.209 0.220 0.203
AR (1)            0.001 0.003 0.003
AR (2)            0.621 0.142 0.140
Number of Observations  1390          1390 1188 1188 1188
Number of Firms  202          202 202 202 202
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time series heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. The GMM estimates are all two-step estimates. 
Standard errors are corrected for finite sample bias following Windmeijer (2002). For the Sargan, AR(1) and AR(2) tests, the statistic reported is the p-value. *** Statistically 
different from zero at the 0.01 level of significance. ** Statistically different from zero at the 0.05 level of significance. * Statistically different from zero at the 0.1 level of 
significance.  
  26Table 10. Dependent Variable: Investment Ratio 
 











































































































Expo*RER (t)          -0.0005 
(0.0018) 
Expo*CRISK (t)             -0.0012 
(0.0031) 
Dollar Ratio (t –1) 
*RER (t)        -0.0136 
(0.0114)   
Dollar Ratio (t –1) 
*CRISK (t)         -0.0454 ** 
(0.0188) 
Year  Effects                Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclusion Restrictions: 
Year Effects  0.0003              0.0001 0.2125 0.2586 0.2534 0.2290 0.0360
Sargan Test  …..              ….. 0.126 0.115 0.147 0.150 0.518
AR (1)  ….              ….. 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
AR (2)  ….              ….. 0.514 0.517 0.204 0.277 0.390
Number of Observations  1390              1390 1188 1188 1066 1188 1066
Number of Firms  202              202 202 202 202 202 202
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time series heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. The GMM estimates are all two-step estimates. 
Standard errors are corrected for finite sample bias following Windmeijer (2002). For the Sargan, AR(1) and AR(2) tests, the statistic reported is the p-value. *** Statistically 
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APPENDIX 2: Data Definition and Sources 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Dollar Ratio 
Ratio of debt denominated in foreign currency 
(converted into local currency using the end-of-
period exchange rate) over total debt. 
Balance sheet data obtained from 
Economatica, Buenos Aires Stock 
Exchange, regulatory agencies, and 
Inspeccion General de Justicia. 
Leverage Ratio   Ratio of total debt over assets.   See Dollar Ratio. 
Investment Ratio 
Ratio of purchases of fixed assets net of disposal 
of fixed assets over assets. 
Cash-flow Statements obtained from 
Economatica, Buenos Aires Stock 
Exchange, regulatory agencies, and 
Inspeccion General de Justicia. 
Sales Ratio 
Ratio of revenue from main operating activities 
over assets.  
Income Statements obtained from 
Economatica, Buenos Aires Stock 
Exchange, regulatory agencies, and 
Inspeccion General de Justicia. 
Real Sales  Revenue from main operating activities over 
assets in constant pesos.  
See Sales Ratio. 
Earnings Ratio  Ratio of earnings before accrued interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization over assets.  
See Investment Ratio. 
Assets 
Sum of total current assets, long-term 
receivables, investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, other investments, net property, 
plant and equipment, and other assets.  
See Dollar Ratio. 
Expo 
Sector export content measured as the export-to-
value added ratio. Firms are assigned to sectors 
according to their production mix.  
Ministry of Finance. 
Impo 
Sector import content measured as the import-
to-value added ratio. Firms are assigned to 
sectors according to their production mix.  
Ministry of Finance. 
Deflator 
Sectoral value added at current prices over 
sectoral value added at constant prices, 
normalized by the GDP deflator.  
Ministry of Finance. 
RER 
Real effective exchange rate, measured as the 
average bilateral RER vis a vis the country main 
trade partners, weighted by the average export 
share for 1995-1999.  
ECLAC, based on IMF. 
CRISK 
Currency risk measured as the differential 
between peso and dollar interbank deposit rates, 
using daily one-month interest rate premiums. 
Central Bank of Argentina. 
Dollar Indexation 
Dummy that equals one for privatized firms in 
regulated sectors if rates are indexed by the 
United States’ Consumer Price Index. 
Regulatory Agencies. 
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